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Abstract 
What do disability labels give us and what do they steal from us? How possible is it to 
live our lives without categories when life ± which encompasses these nebulous 
categories of culture, society and relationships ± is so, well, necessarily categorical? 
These questions are typical of the kinds of questions asked by scholars of critical 
disability studies which is an interdisciplinary field that brings together people 
interested in understanding the meaning of disability and contesting the exclusion of 
disabled people from mainstream society. In this brief provocation I want to explore 
disability labels through recourse to three perspectives that have much to say about 
categorisation, disability and the human condition: the biopsychological, the 
biopolitical and, what I term, an in-between-al politics. It is my view that disability 
categories intervene in the world in some complex and often contradictory ways. It is 
up to us to work out how we live with these contradictions. One way of living with 
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contradictions is to work across disciplinary boundaries: thus situating ourselves 
across divides and embracing uncertainty and contradiction in order to enhance all our 
lives. I will conclude with some interdisciplinary thoughts for the field of Adapted 
Physical Activity (APA). 
 
Introduction 
This paper was written following my introduction to the diverse thought surrounding 
adapted physical activity through an invitation to present a keynote paper on critical 
disability studies at the North American Symposium of Adapted Physical Activity, 
Edmonton, 2016 and subsequent engagement with people at various sessions of 
conference. My paper begins with some questions. What do labels give us and what 
do they from us steal? How possible is it to live our lives without categories when life 
± which encompasses these nebulous categories of culture, society and relationships ± 
is so, well, necessarily categorical? Could one live a radical life without labels? And 
when one thinks of education, APA or any other profession ± and the institutions that 
work on the bases of sifting and sorting individuals on the basis of dis/ability - how 
might we theoretically approach the question of categories in ways that are beneficial 
to disabled people, their allies and associated practitioners? In short, what is in a 
label? In this brief provocation I want to explore disability labels through recourse to 
three perspectives that have much to say about categorisation, disability and the 
human condition: the biopsychological, the biopolitical and, what I term, an in-
between-al politics. It is my view that disability categories intervene in the world in 
some complex and often contradictory ways. It is up to us to work out how we live 
with these contradictions. 
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The biopsychological 
Let me start with the biopsychological. This perspective is one well known within the 
APA community and one that has been an ever-present epistemology in my 
professional life. I teach onto an MSc course in Psychology and Education. This 
reflects my undergraduate training as a psychologist. This course seeks to interpolate 
graduates into the discipline of psychology. By the end of the course, students 
graduate with a qualification that is recognised by the British Psychological Society 
(BPS). Students then have the essential psychological training that they need to move 
forward into the various practitioner roles we have come to associate with psychology 
including educational, clinical, organisational and counselling psychology. Leaving to 
one side, for now, my own cognitive dissonance in relation to supporting the upkeep 
of the discipline of psychology through my own teaching (and ignoring too how 
psychologically and physiologically dirty it makes me feel) one key aim of the course 
is to introduce students to: 
 
Psychopathology, psychological disorders, biogenic and neuropsychology. 
 
These are just a taste of the curriculum required by the BPS if the course is to be 
recognised as a true conversion masters course in psychology. To be psychological is 
to know psychological disorder. Because, we are taught, when we know deficit we 
can understand capacity. This is the classic pathogenic (rather than salutogenic) 
approach that has served psychology, medicine and their pseudo-disciplines for many 
years: understand the abnormal in order to comprehend the normal (see Watson, 
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2004).  And in so doing posits the normal as already there in the background not 
requiring interrogation nor consideration (as if we already know what normal actually 
is). In the field of critical disability studies we would understand this as an example of 
the individual model of disability that tends to understand the problems of disability 
in terms of deficiencies, deficits and limits associated with specific sensory, physical 
or cognitive impairments (see Goodley, 2016 for an overview of this approach). This 
model under-girds a lot of practice in APA: in the identification of those individuals 
that APA practitioners will then work with; in the forms of intervention that seek to 
change embodied practice and in the language of disability that abounds in APA and 
its related professions. 
 
For many disability studies scholars these words of deficiency are the work of the 
GHYLO,Q%ULWDLQLQWKHVGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQVGHILQHGWKHLUDFWLYLVP
in direct opposition to medicalizing, individualizing and psychologizing terms of 
disability reference. Proponents such as Mike Oliver (1990, 1996) developed a 
counter-hegemonic view that while impairment existed, disability was the proper 
focus and real concern of disabled people and their allies. Oliver and his comrades 
drew on the distinction on the work of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation, who already back in the mid 1970s, had promoted a politicised 
perspective on disability (UPIAS, 1976). UPIAS made a distinction between 
impairment (the presence of some form of measurable cognitive, physical and sensory 
substantive difference) and disability (the socio-political, historical and cultural 
exclusion of people with impairments from mainstream life). In latter years this 
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definition of disability was reframed in terms of disablism, defined by Carol Thomas 
as:  
 
µDIRUPRIVRFLDORSSUHVVLRQLQYROYLQJWKHVRFLDOLPSRVLWLRQRIUHVWULFWLRQVRI
activity on people with impairments and the socially engendered undermining 
of their psycho-HPRWLRQDOZHOOEHLQJ¶7KRPDV 
 
Here, for many disability theorists and activists, is the real focus of their activism and 
work: the eradication of disablism in the lives of people with impairments. The irony 
is that the in politicizing disability and defining disablism, the social model left 
impairment unchecked, under-theorised and ignored.  Impairment remains, for social 
modellists such as Oliver, the elephant in the room.  
 
Responses in the disability studies literature to this over-sight can be categorised in a 
number of ways. First, is a prolonged ignorance by social modellists who simply 
continue to ignore impairment. As Mike Oliver infamously put it in his 1996 book, 
disability was a shared collective concern but impairment was merely a private, 
personal experience. His interests were in disability, not impairment. And any 
DWWHPSWVWRIRFXVRQWKHODWWHUUDWKHUWKDQWKHIRUPHUZRXOGµZDWHUGRZQ¶WKHVRFLDO
model.  
 
The second response, is an embracing (or re-embracing) of impairment as a reality. 
Writers such as Carol Thomas (1999), Tom Shakespeare (2006) and Simo Vehmas 
and Nick Watson (2013) have argued that impairment is a real entity, meriting 
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recognition, understood as a pre-social phenomenon that we come to know in our 
relationships with our bodies, minds and other people. The Nordic relational model of 
disability ± for example ± is an approach that recognises impairment and situates it in 
a network of relationships between bodies, minds, society, welfare systems and 
culture. This approach would, I assume, readily fit with the majority of research in 
APA which seeks to respond to impairment in ways that promote physical activity.  
 
A third response is what we might term an enculturation of impairment by cultural 
theorists such as Mitchell and Snyder (2015) in the States and Shelley Tremain (2005) 
in Canada. By this I mean there is a turn to the cultural, historical and social 
constitution of impairment as a real thing that exists and becomes known in the world 
through culture. Enculturation refers to the ways in which cultural discourses and 
practices come to know and constitute objects (such as impairment) and human 
subject (impaired people). This approach has been especially important in bringing 
together social scientific and humanities disciplines to synthesise understandings 
around the historical, social, economic, cultural and systemic constitution of disability 
and its opposite ability. Indeed, as I argue in my Goodley (2014) book, disability can 
only ever be made through direct reference to its opposite ability; and it is these 
oppositional processes that find the making of entities that we consider to be 
ab/normal or dis/abled. Here, then, impairment and disability are pulled away from a 
disciplinary anchoring in psychology and medicine (as is often the case with the 
individual model of disability) and resited in the social world. 
 
A fourth response to the question of impairment is offered by phenomenology. Rod 
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Michalko (2002) and Tanya Titchkosky (2003), for example, have come to write 
DERXWKRZEOLQGQHVVDQGG\VOH[LDDUHIHOWDQGNQRZQWKURXJKWKHERG\¶VUHODWLRQVKLS
in the world. Impairment is a deeply complex embodied and cultural phenomenon that 
is felt physically, emotionally and politically.  
 
In recent years talking about impairment has become less controversial in disability 
studies literature. And this opening up of impairment talk is something I very much 
ZHOFRPH%XWZKDWDERXWP\GLVFLSOLQH¶VSODFHDWWKHWDEOH":KDWPLJKWpsychology 
offer to our understandings of impairment?  
 
Let me return to my teaching on the MSc Psychology Conversion course and the 
requirements of the BPS.  And thanks here to my colleague Dr Jill Smith, Sheffield 
Hallam University, for sharing her teaching notes: notes that she delivers as part of 
her teaching on a course on autism. The BPS expects us to identify and elaborate on a 
number of specific categories. One of these is autism. The BPS also expects us to 
convey the meaning of a number of distinct psychological perspectives. One of these 
is the biopsychological. So, this is a taste of what I do (borrowing from Jill).  
 
 
 
Powerpoint Slide 1  
As we learnt in week 1, autism is currently diagnosed based on observed 
LPSDLUPHQWVLQWKUHHDUHDV« 
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Powerpoint Slide 2 
µ7ULDGRI,PSDLUPHQWV¶:LQJ 
Ɣ Language and communication 
Ɣ 2. Social and emotional development 
Ɣ 3. Flexibility of thought 
We need to look at theory to understand how these areas became the 
diagnostic criteria for autism 
 
Powerpoint Slide 3 
Major theories of autism 
 These are based on psychological (cognitive) and/or medical ideas 
about autism 
 They each position autism as 'within the individual' and so are linked 
to the medical (or individual) model of disability as we will see in the 
session today 
 
Powerpoint Slide 4 
The main theories of autism 
Theory of Mind 
Executive Function 
Central Coherence 
Empathizing-Systematizing 
 
Powerpoint Slide 5 
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Theory of Mind  
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) 
Ɣ ToM is the ability to empathise with others and imagine their thoughts 
& feelings 
Ɣ Typically develops around the age of 4 
Ɣ Baron-Cohen et al. believed this cognitive process to be impaired (or 
deficit) in autistic children 
 
 
Let me interrupt the teaching session there and ask, as I do with students, what does 
this story of a specific disability category offer us? And what does it take away?  
Biopsychology feeds into a peculiarly 21st Century form of identity politics that 
Nicolas Rose and colleagues have termed biological citizenship (Rose and Novas, 
2004). Autism constitutes an example of a contemporaneous project that links 
citizenship to beliefs about the biological existence of human beings, as individuals, 
as families and lineages, as communities, as population and races, and as a species. 
One becomes known through the category of autism permitting us to understand this 
category: 
Ɣ In terms of deficits that require diagnozing; 
Ɣ As an administrative object that releases the state to act and offer its welfare, 
social care and educational services; 
Ɣ As a functioning and functionalist category that pulls in the resources of what 
Mallet and Runswick Cole (2016) term the autism industry that encompasses a 
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smorgasbord of treatments, interventions, cures, specialist equipment and 
technologies of the self. 
Ɣ And, in many cases, autism becomes a master narrative for people around 
ZKLFKWRSROLWLFDOO\RUJDQLVHH[SODLQRQH¶VSHFFDGLOORVDQGFHOHEUDWHGLYHUVLW\
as evidenced by these images here: 
 
Interestingly, in my teaching experiences and in conversations with colleagues who 
work as educational psychologists, when we examine the nature of autism-as-
impairment we inevitably reproduce scientific, disciplinary, methodological and 
analytical debates. This is not to say that we dismiss autism as not existing. Far from 
it; as good constructionists we are interested in the making of things. But this is the 
not the same as conceding autism to some naturalistic, pre-social, biological, 
untouched-by-culture thing, as the disability studies realists such as Vehmas and 
Shakespeare (or individual model of disability) might argue.  Their perspective is an 
either / or one ± either one has to accept that impairment is real or risk falling into 
some kind of restless, silly/fruitless relativism. This setting up of a right or wrong way 
of approaching disability labels is, at best, narrow minded and, at worse, ignorant of 
the dynamics ways in which we work as human beings to make sense of our worlds. 
Understandings of the reality of impairment will differ depending upon the person or 
a given time in a persRQ¶VOLIH5HDOLVPDQG,GRXEWLWVFULWLFDOLW\IDLOVWRJHWWRJULSV
with the truly categorical workings of society. Realism wants to do away with the 
complexities of category-PDNLQJDQGVKRXWLQVWHDGµORRNWKHUHLVUHDOLW\WKHUHLV
DXWLVP¶7KLVWKHtactic adopted by the neurodiversity movement where more than one 
real version of autism is claimed as difference ± nor disorder ± but real difference 
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associated with differently wired brains (see Runswick-Cole et al, 2016). However, 
the practice of claiming reality is another word game.  If we accept that the meaning 
of lands and mountains changes dependent upon an indigenous (Aotearoa) or non-
indigenous (New Zealand) perspective then we can surely accept that a label such as 
autism (which has shifted expression, cause and form since its inception) is a complex 
moving category.  
 
The biopolitical  
Any discussion of the application of disability categories to human life itself 
inevitably moves us into a discussion of biopolitics. Such a move is one that I 
personally made when I undertook my PhD thesis in a sociology department in the 
1990s in Britain. So, forgive me for offering a 101 intURGXFWLRQWR0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶V
ELRSRZHU/HWXVWDNH5DELQRZDQG5RVH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIELRSRZHUZKLFK
involves: 
(1) RQHRUPRUHWUXWKGLVFRXUVHVDERXWWKHµYLWDO¶FKDUDFWHURIOLYLQJKXPDQEHLQJV
with an array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth (for 
example, autism as a neurological fact described through neuropsychology);  
(2) strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and 
health (diagnosis and educational intervention in relation to autistic children);  
(3) and modes of subjectification, in which individuals work on themselves in the 
name of individual or collective life or health (autistic people, their families 
and a panoply of professionals that work around them internalize the category 
of autism). 
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So, just as autism is diagnosed so it releases a tidal wave of biopolitical 
(im)possibilities about the self and the population. Biopower cannot help but produce 
in excess of itself and this leads to what we might term Biopolitical activism. This is 
precisely what Hardt and Negri (2000) had in mind when they synthesised their 
theory of Empire. Their work critical analyses the kinds of knowledge produced by 
globalization, the economic expansion of late capitalism, rapid developments in 
communication and the impact of biopower on the subjectivities, living conditions 
DQGDFWLYLVPRIµWKHJOREDOFLWL]HQ¶$VP\VHOIDQG5HEHFFD/DZWKRPKDYHZULWWHQ
elsewhere (Goodley and Lawthom, 2011), human subjects of the Global North and 
the Global South are hybridized and mixed: a FRPSOH[µJOREDO¶DPDOJDP$WWKHKHDUW
of Empire is the Foucauldian notion of biopower. Discourses of biopower are 
re/produced in institutional regimes (of family, school, healthcare and welfare setting, 
prison and workplace) in the context of the new world order; comprised of the bomb 
(USA), money (transnational corporations) and ether (the Internet) (Balakrishnan, 
2000: 144). Our sense of selves and others are made through biopolitical constitution 
of our subjectivities. 
 
Subjectivity is a constant social SURFHVVRIJHQHUDWLRQ«WKHPDWHULDOSUDFWLFHV
set out for the subject in the context of the institution (be they kneeling down 
to pray or changing hundreds of diapers) are the 
SURGXFWLRQSURFHVVHVRIVXEMHFWLYLW\«WKHLQVWLWXWLRQVSURYLGHDERYHDOOD
discrete place (the home, the chapel, the classroom, the shop floor) where the 
production of subjectivity is enacted. (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 190) 
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As we argue in Goodley and Lawthom (2013) global citizens are more and more 
likely to come into contact with biopower through the rapid global expansion of the 
capitalist free-market. This is classic Foucault.  
 
Biopower designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives 
DVLWVSULPDU\JRDOäLåHN%LRSRZHUUHJXODWHVOLIHIURPWKHLQWHrior 
of subjects, a power that human subjects embrace and reactivate of their own 
accord (Rustin, 2002: 453). Ideas from psychiatry, psychology and education, 
for example, know no fixed boundaries as they are caught up in plural pan-
national exchanges of iQIRUPDWLRQDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQµ(PSLUH¶UHIHUVWRD
globalized biopolitical machine  (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 40) ± or biopolitical 
capitalism (Abbinnett, 2007: 51) ± through which theories and practices of 
subjectivity, being and psychology spread across the globe, infecting or 
affecting citizens in every corner of the world. As Balakrishnan (2000: 143) 
puts it: Empire is a diffuse, anonymous network of all-englobing power: a 
phantasmic polity. Its flows of people, information and wealth are simply too 
unruly to be monitored from metropolitan control centres (Goodley and 
Lawthom, 2013: 372). 
 
To label or not to label is a question asked by all of us as we are caught up in the 
excesses of globalised biopolitics - or Empire for short. And, yet, the labels abound in 
even coming to ask the question:  
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To label or not to label? 
Citizens commission on human rights  
Please visit http://www.cchrint.org/ 
 
This film demonstrates the biopolitical maelstrom that young people often find 
themselves caught up in. You will see different labels being applied here. Instead of 
Autism, ADHD or Compulsive Defiance Disorder, the young people claim the 
categoties of activist, inventor and entrepreneur. Interestingly, these labels are broadly 
associated with success and achievement.  They are markers of ability rather than 
disability: hardly surprizing when we live in a contemporary society that emphasises 
self-sufficiency, autonomy and independence in a time of welfare cuts and austerity 
(Goodley, 2014). This leads us to consider the ways in which biopolitics creates 
categories of disability and ability. Here we have to think about the new categories of 
human enhancement or advanced humanness that prejudice our thoughts: 
 
Gifted and talented 
Cognitive enhancement 
Prosthetic support 
Technological advance 
The rebooting of humanity 
 
All of these futuristic ± and sci-fi depictions of a human life made less ordinary ± 
remind us that the human is anything other than a fixed, biologically situated, 
intellectually known, ahistorically constituted, non sociologically understood 
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phenomenon. Now is the time to deal properly with this complexity. I would suggest 
that APA practitioners and researchers are all too aware of the cultural and social 
shaping of the body. An interdisciplinary space that seeks to enhance human 
movement brings to bare on the body a myriad of complex and sophisticated 
practices. The body becomes marked by these practices in search of improvement. 
One wonders, then, to what extent we are moving away from a focus on normalisation 
to a socio-historical period of individual enhancement. Such a move raises some 
serious ethical and political questions for us all. 
 
An in-between-all politics  
My third perspective desires and rejects categories with equal measure. It is a 
necessarily bifurcated position: one in-keeping with my own inter-disciplinary 
training as psychologist-turned-sociologist. To desire disability whilst also being 
repulsed by what disability categories do fits with what Judith Butler (1993) frames as 
a use-and-refusal politics and what Tanya Titchkosky heralds in her work as an in-
between-al politics of disability (see for example her superlative 2011 The Question 
of Access). For feminists, it is referred to as living with the paradoxes of patriarchy. 
For disability scholars it reminds us of living in the complex world punctuated by the 
divergent practices of disablism (the erasure of disability) and ableism (the promotion 
of an isolationist autonomous citizen). And perhaps, most of all, an in-between-al 
perspective learns most from postcolonial figures such as Frantz Fanon (1976) and 
Sylvia Wynter (2003) who start with the categorical reality that the black man and 
woman do not exist, recognises the brutal rejection of such a state of affairs and 
physically seeks to decolonise the very register that allowed such shit to exist in the 
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first place. An in-between-DOSROLWLFVSXWVLQWRDFWLRQ7DQ\D7LWFKNRVN\¶V
invitation to imagine what might occur in the space between ± and in reverberation 
from each side of the binary relationality ± of distinct oppositional positions; 
 
Disability ± Ability 
Abnormality ± Normality 
Impaired ± Non-impaired 
Crip ± Normative 
Disruption ± Status Quo 
Biopsychological ± Biopolitical 
 
So, my call is for a frictional politics (a term I borrow from Jasbir Puar, 2012) that 
keeps in tension these opposites as part of what we might term a DisHuman 
positionality (Goodley and Runswick Cole, 2014). A DisHuman perspectives 
disavows labels ± it desires them at the very same time that it rejects them and this 
contrary relationship of back and forth goes on and on. Becoming DisHuman posits 
that thinking about the human always involves thinking about disability. One cannot 
separate the two nor, in our frictional world of labelling, could be separate these two 
phenomenon. It is possible to see some radical work being done in this in-between-al 
space. An example is provided by the JusticeforLB campaign which brought together 
a recognition that a young man with the labels of autism and epilepsy was allowed to 
die in a service setting (through drowning in the bath) because his humanity was not 
taken seriously. JusticeforLB is a DisHuman campaign1: it thinks of what it means to 
                                                        
1 Please see http://justiceforlb.org/ and follow @JusticeforLB on Twitter. 
17 
 
be human through a consideration (and challenge to) the ways in which we think of 
those who have intellectual disabilities. It starts with disability and then through this 
demands that we ask more broader questions about humanity including: 
 
o Who do we value and why? 
o Is everyone invited into the human category? 
o What happens when people see only a label and not the human? 
o How might we learn again about our common humanity through the politics 
of disability? 
 
Indeed, inspired by the activism of JusticeforLB, Humanactivism.org is a website that 
seeks to capture the impacts of austerity and cuts to services on the everyday lives of 
people with intellectual disabilities in Britain. It starts with a very human question: 
can people survive with out support systems around to support them? It also plots and 
captures a number of very human moments of support associated with self-advocacy, 
work and community living. And humanactivism.org reports on one key finding: 
people with intellectual disabilities are often the most skilled and capable at looking 
after other people with intellectual disabilities. This is a DisHuman frictional moment 
± when we think of disability we think of humanity and, crucially, in order to 
emphasise particular elements of humanity (that risk being quashed by austerity) we 
should turn to disability.  
 
You see, the problem with those who want to either find the realities of impairment or 
WKHIDOVLWLHVRILPSDLUPHQWLVWKDWWKH\LJQRUHGLVDELOLW\¶VG\QDPLFUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
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humanity. We need to embrace an in-between-al politics (captured by the DisHuman 
perspective) that allows us to understand what labels simultaneously give and take 
away whilst keeping in mind that our real concern as educators should always be the 
enhancement of humanity. This will involve us re-imagining that is there; nurturing 
our relations to what is there thus raizing our awareness of the complex relationship 
that we have with labels.  Now is not time for an either / or approach to our thinking 
and practice. For APA this way of thinking would seek to always questioning the 
consequences of our professional, empirical and theoretical interventions. What is 
gained but also lost when we seek to improve human movement of someone with a 
physical impairment? What assumptions of deficit, failure and lack do we bring with 
us when we find disability? How else might we think of disability other than as an 
object requiring rehabilitation? What kinds of relationships and new ways of thinking 
are prompted by the presence of disability? How does APA contribute to and contest 
the commonly held view that disability is undesirable and therefore in need of 
erasure? 
 
Conclusions 
I am no expert on APA. Nor do I have experience of the nuanced and complex 
debates in this field. That said, I am aware that APA starts with the biopsychological 
register when it finds the very subject and objects of its research and intervention: 
namely disabled people. My sense then is things get quickly biopolitical; as we 
consider the tensions, debates and justifications for professional interventions. We 
also find ourselves considered the consequences of participating in APA. Here, I think 
before long, we will find an in-between-al space where we to and fro between the 
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positivities of naming and addreszing disability alongside recognizing a shared 
commonality. APA is a field that, as the editors of this volume in their personal 
correspondence reminded me, that focuses on the moving body. But what do we do to 
this body and what are the potential consequences? APA embraces such things as 
running blades and sport wheelchair technology with the explicit aim of improving 
performance and maximizing the functions of the impaired body. This is all well and 
good but how might such practices feed into contemporaneous discourses associated 
with human enhancement? These very practices clearly rely upon economic and 
cultural capital to grow and tend to benefit people in high-income nations in the 
global north.  Human enhancement also feeds into austerity politics and neoliberal 
attitudes that place responsibility for human flourishing in the individual bodies and 
minds of individual citizens rather than the state. What we do with disability in our 
professional lives will have huge implications in the wider world. 
 
Disability and APA benefit from this liminal space of in-between-ness precisely 
because it invites in interdisciplinary conversations and dialogues. Disciplines 
prematurely feel that they already know the answers to their problems. Too often the 
TXHVWLRQVWKDWGLVFLSOLQH¶VVHHNWRDQVZHUDUHOLPLWHGDQGDWWLPHVSODLQVWXSLG
Interdisciplinarity makes the foundations of disciplines shaky and their belief systems 
shaky. Such movement is absolutely essential if we are to work alongside disabled 
people as experts on their own life trajectories and political ambitions: a goal that I 
think would be shared by many in and outside of APA. 
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